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Commitment devices offer an opportunity to restrict future choices. However, if severe 
restrictions deter participation, weaker restrictions may be a more effective means of changing 
behavior. We test this using a school-based commitment savings device for educational expenses 
in Uganda. We compare an account fully-committed to educational expenses to an account in 
which savings are available for cash withdrawal but intended for educational expenses. The 
weaker commitment generates increased savings in the program accounts and when combined 
with a parent outreach program, higher expenditures on educational supplies. It also increases 
scores on an exam covering language and math skills by 0.14 standard deviations. We find no 
effect for the fully-committed account, and we find no effect for either account on attendance, 
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 “Make it easy” – Richard Thaler, co-author of Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, 
Wealth, and Happiness (Clement 2013) 
 
Section I. Introduction 
We test whether a strong versus weak savings commitment device helps children and their 
families save more, spend more on educational expenses, and achieve higher test scores. We are 
motivated by three issues. First, we want to examine the net tradeoff between higher 
participation but lower compliance from weak commitment devices and lower participation but 
higher compliance from strong commitment devices. This thus becomes a test between a stricter 
commitment device and a weaker “make it easy” nudge of individuals towards a specific 
behavior (Thaler and Sunstein 2009). Second, we test for changes in expenditures, to answer a 
question that often lingers around interventions that aim to increase savings (Karlan, Ratan, and 
Zinman 2013): did the increased savings in one vehicle change actual expenditures, or simply 
come from a reshuffling of one’s balance sheet across different products? Finally, we test 
whether an intervention which leads to higher investment by households in school supplies then 
improves educational outcomes for children. This has implications for the production function of 
primary school education, and potential methods for relaxing financing constraints that hinder 
educational progress for children. 
Commitment devices offer individuals an opportunity to restrict future choices. Self-aware 
individuals may prefer such restrictions in order to resist future temptations, or to deflect future 
claims on assets from family or extended social networks. Indeed, prior research has found 
demand for savings accounts that restrict access to one’s money in order to help with self-control 
issues (Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin 2006). 
However, the specifics of what one means by “commitment” on a commitment savings account 
can vary in critical ways, and accordingly have large differential impacts on whether an account 
is opened, how much one deposits, when one withdraws, and perhaps most importantly, how 
ultimate consumption and investment choices differ. We focus here on one key dimension: 
whether the funds deposited are locked in for a specific “good” expenditure, or if individuals 
have freedom to spend withdrawals as they wish, but the “good” item is made easily available.1 
The tradeoff is clear: a strong commitment device may be more effective in enforcing the 
behavior of the future self, but the current self may be less likely to participate in the contract at 
all. An individual may want to commit in some, but not all, future states of the world, since 
emergencies do happen. The challenge is finding a contract where a third party has the right level 
                                                            
1 Clearly in a perfect market, specifically one with zero transaction costs, this would make no difference: any items 
purchased with the locked-in commitment account could simply be sold in exchange for the most desirable item for 
the same value. In our market, supplies and services associated with primary education in Uganda, there are 
significant enough transaction costs to make such an exchange quite costly, and thus the original expenditure sticky. 
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 of discretion on whether to enforce. If an individual cannot trust any third parties with that 
discretion, a self-enforcing commitment contract may work instead. In such a contract, the 
increased price of vice is derived from psychic costs, i.e., disappointment with oneself and one’s 
lack of adherence to a plan. This is akin to a model put forward by Benabou and Tirole 
(2004)(2004) on how personal rules can shift later behavior, and also could be construed as a test 
of whether “mental accounting” can be an policy instrument that induces behavior change 
(Shefrin and Thaler 1992). 
However, a shift in savings behavior may not matter, if there are offsetting behaviors. For 
example, more money saved in a commitment account may come at the expense of lower savings 
elsewhere, or worse, higher borrowing at higher interest rates. By examining how actual 
expenditures change, rather than merely observing whether savings increases, we are able to 
make stronger statements about welfare outcomes, similar to Ashraf et al (2010) with respect to 
household durable goods purchases and Dupas and Robinson (2013) with respect to health 
investments. 
The savings program helps families save for school related expenses and generates random 
variation in the level of school supplies across students. This thus allows us to better understand 
the education production process (Kremer and Holla 2009). In particular, we contribute to two 
areas of the literature. First, we build on a growing body of evidence demonstrating the effects of 
basic school supplies – notebooks, uniforms, workbooks, etc. – on student performance (Das et 
al. 2013; Hidalgo et al. 2013) and parental involvement (Avvisati et al. 2013). Second, the results 
build on existing evidence of the importance of savings constraints for educational expenses 
(Barrera-Osorio et al. 2011).2 
Our setup is as follows: working with a local nonprofit organization Private Education 
Development Network (PEDN) in the Busoga sub-region of the Eastern region of Uganda, and 
Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA), we randomly assigned 136 primary schools to one of three 
groups: a strong commitment savings account, a weak commitment savings account, or control. 
For both treatments, students could deposit cash into an account. Although the accounts were 
framed as their accounts, we cannot rule out that some of the funds were parent’s funds..3 We 
developed a brief teacher training component, and also coordinated the transfer of money from a 
savings box held at the school to a local bank for safekeeping. One year into the implementation, 
we implemented one sub-treatment in half of the treatment schools, a parental involvement 
workshop. 
                                                            
2 It is interesting to note that, while we find that relaxing savings constraints improves educational outcomes, we 
find improvements in academic performance rather than participation. This contradicts the results of Barrera-Osorio 
et al. (2011) which finds that distributing funds at the time that families have to pay enrollment expenses improves 
enrollment rates. The difference may, in part, be due to the fact that unlike Uganda, Colombian schools still charged 
official fees for enrollment.  
3 As we show below, both the children and other family members contribute to the accounts, raising the possibility 
that multiple household mechanisms are involved. 
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 The first stage is critical and revealing: students deposit significantly more money into the soft 
commitment savings account than the hard commitment savings account. And, for those with the 
parental outreach sub-treatment, the additional money deposited into the account leads to higher 
investment in school supplies, which then in turn leads to higher test scores. We find a 0.13 
standard deviation (se=0.04) improvement in overall scores; this includes effects on each of the 
covered subjects: grammar (0.12 standard deviations, se=0.04), reading (0.13 standard 
deviations, se=0.05), and math (0.08 standard deviation, se=0.04). The implication for the school 
production function is simple: for a student to learn basic skills, having a pen, paper and 
workbook matters. Furthermore, the treatment effect on educational outcomes is sizable, as large 
as many direct educational interventions, and consistent with other estimates of the effects of 
such supplies (Das et al. 2013) We find no effect on student participation (either attendance or 
enrollment) or on a set of non-cognitive outcomes. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: We provide an overview of the Ugandan 
education system and the individual treatments in Section II. Section III contains the research 
design and a description of the data. We assess the internal validity in Section IV and present the 
main results in Section V. Finally, we conclude in Section VI. 
Section II. Background 
A. Ugandan Primary Education System 
Uganda abolished most primary school fees in 1997.4 In the same year, the gross primary 
enrollment rate5 ballooned from 87 percent in the early 1990s, to 123 percent in 1997. Between 
1997 and 1996, 2.3 million children enrolled in primary school, increasing total enrollment to 5.7 
million (“Uganda Hits Universal Primary Education Target” 2000).  
Unfortunately, while most children now enroll in primary school, the majority of them fail to 
graduate. In 2008, for example, the gross enrollment rate6 in lower secondary was 33 percent–11 
percentage points below the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (UNESCO 2013). The transition 
from primary to secondary is a challenge, as in many countries. However, the majority of 
Ugandan students simply fail to complete primary school. As of 2010, only 32 percent of 
students entering primary school completed the seventh grade (“Opportunities Lost: The Impact 
of Grade Repetition and Early School Leaving” 2012). 
                                                            
4 Initially, up to four children per family could attend school without paying tuition fees. However, previously the 
government abolished tuition fees for all children (Murphy, Bertoncino, and Wang 2002). 
5 The net primary school enrollment ratio is the ratio of the number of enrolled primary school children, regardless 
of age, to the total number of primary school-aged children in the population. 
6 The gross enrollment rate for lower secondary school is the ratio of the number of children enrolled in lower 
secondary school regardless of age relative to the total number of children in the population who are of age to attend 
secondary school. 
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 While the poor quality of primary education is a likely factor (Piper 2010),7 students still face 
financial barriers. Students no longer pay enrollment fees, but they face other expenses. Many 
schools require uniforms, and families are responsible for providing food and school supplies, 
such as paper, writing instruments, and workbooks. With the approval of the parent-teacher 
association and school management committee, schools can also charge fees for ancillary 
services such as supplementary lessons, practice exams and feeding programs. Official policy 
prohibits preventing a child from enrolling due to an inability to pay, but the majority of 
dropouts cite financial concerns. In the baseline survey described below, families paid an 
average of 5,790 UGX (2.30 USD) to send a child to school for a year, 0.5 percent of Uganda’s 
per capita income in 2010 (UN data 2013). 
Confusion and suspicion create additional complications. As we discovered through qualitative 
interviews and feedback from parents, politicians try to drum up support by claiming school fees 
are illegal. The terms “universal” and “free” education are sometimes used interchangeably. 
Many parents do not understand the official financing rules. Some believe that the government 
should provide for all school related expenses. Finally, rumors of corruption can make even 
knowledgeable parents reluctant to pay. 
B. Description of the Intervention 
To facilitate families’ and children’s saving for school, we evaluated four variations of a school-
based savings program. The intervention had two primary objectives. First, it sought to facilitate 
and encourage the practice of children saving for education, and through saving, improve overall 
academic performance and support students’ continued enrollment. The program targeted 
students in grades 5, 6, and 7, the last three years of primary school, in order to target students at 
high risk for dropping out of school.8 
We developed and implemented the programs in partnership with the Private Education 
Development Network (PEDN). PEDN is a Ugandan non-profit organization focusing on youth 
financial and entrepreneurial education. PEDN comprises five full and part time employees, 
often supplemented by project specific staff that PEDN hires as needed. For the savings 
programs, IPA worked with PEDN to hire a local implementation team of about 10 people.9 
Each of the four treatment variations included the same core components: a savings account 
administered through the school, and a program to support and encourage use of the accounts. 
During an introductory meeting, the implementation team described the program to a joint 
                                                            
7 The dramatic increases in enrollment have strained existing resources. In the average school in 2005, three children 
had to share the same textbook and 94 children crammed into a single classroom (Independent Evaluation Group 
(IEG) 2007). 
8 Uganda follows a 7+2+2 grade structure. Students attend primary school for seven years followed by two years 
each of lower and then upper secondary school. 
9 This includes only those individuals hired to implement the described programs. It does not include the research 
staff who conducted the surveys and monitoring visits described below. 
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 meeting of the Parent Teacher Associate, the School Management Committee, and other 
interested parents. If they all voted to participate, we provided each school with metal lock 
boxes. A designated teacher assisted by student-elected10 representatives from each class then 
managed the program. The implementation team conducted weekly visits to each school to 
encourage saving and to assist with accounting procedures. Interested students received a 
passbook in which their individual savings were recorded, and the designated teacher and the 
implementation team maintained an official register. Depending on a school’s preference, 
students then deposited money into the lockboxes on a daily or weekly basis.  
To provide security and transparency, two padlocks secured each box. Parents elected a 
representative to keep the key to one lock, while the bank held the other. At the end of each 
trimester,11 the two key holders opened the box. The bank representative provided a deposit slip 
and deposited the funds into the school’s account.12 The accounts did not earn interest. Inflation 
varied but averaged around 10% in this time period, thus the accounts had a negative real interest 
rate. After the break between trimesters, the implementation team and bank representatives 
returned to the school for the payout of the funds. Two representatives signed a withdrawal slip 
to confirm the withdrawal. The designated teacher, student representatives and our team then 
distributed the money according to the savings register. At the same time, the implementation 
team organized a small market at each school where students could purchase school supplies or 
school services such as practice exams or tutoring sessions.13 
On top of the core components above, there were four treatment variations, a 2x2 design: “cash” 
or “voucher” for the withdrawals, and “Parent Outreach” or “No Parent Outreach”. For the cash 
treatment arm, students received, in cash, their savings from one trimester at the beginning of the 
next trimester. They could then spend the funds at their discretion—at the markets provided on 
the disbursement day (thus “making it easy” to spend on school supplies) or elsewhere. The 
voucher treatment arm, on the other hand, employed a stronger commitment — students had to 
buy educational products or services at the market, on the disbursement day. In both variants, 
children could also re-deposit their savings for the next trimester. 
The Parent Outreach component provided a means of addressing misconceptions about school 
fees and Universal Primary Education Policy. The implementation team hosted a meeting for 
sixth and seventh grade parents. The meetings began by identifying the various stakeholders in 
                                                            
10 The Ugandan educational system classifies children enrolled in primary school as “pupils” and those in secondary 
school as “students”. In this article, we refer to all enrolled children as students. 
11 The academic year starts in February and follows a trimester system. Schools run for 12 weeks at a time. Students 
receive a three week break after the first and second terms, and schools are closed in December, January and 
February. 
12 Working with the bank, FINCA Uganda, we designed an account for the intervention modeled on a traditional 
group savings account. We also provided the minimum 5,000 UGX deposit and worked with the school’s elected 
signatories to obtain the documentation required to open the accounts. 
13 Students were allowed to rollover vouchers to future terms, and upon completion of the final year (P7), were 
allowed to withdraw any remaining balance in cash.  
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 primary education, their roles and responsibilities. PEDN then discussed the various ways in 
which parents could support their children’s education. In particular, PEDN explained that in 
addition to providing a student learning experience, the savings program provided an opportunity 
for the household. It could be a tool to help families finance their children’s education. A snack 
and soda were provided to encourage attendance. 
Section III. Design of the Evaluation 
A. Research Design 
Figure 1 depicts the timeline and steps in the randomized trial and data collection. We selected 
136 primary schools from the Jinja, Iganga, Mayuge, and Luuka districts of the Busoga Region 
because they predominantly comprised poor rural and peri-urban schools. We then administered 
a baseline survey and test during the final trimester of 2009. Finally, we randomly assigned 
schools to receive either the cash treatment, voucher treatment, or no treatment, stratifying by the 
total normalized score on the baseline exam and by geographic regions call sub-counties.14 Each 
treatment group comprised 39 schools, and the remaining 58 schools became the control group. 
Following the first randomization, school outreach began. It took two trimesters to recruit the 
majority of schools, but by the beginning of the third trimester of 2010, 95 percent of the 
treatment schools had agreed to participate.15 In total, 77 schools joined and one school refused 
to participate. The school that refused to participate did, however, permit data collection. In what 
follows, we classify the school as if it had accepted the program. 
In 2011, we conducted a second randomization for the parent sensitization program. To isolate 
the effect of the program while still treating all of the schools, we assigned schools either to the 
Parent Outreach group who received the intervention in the first trimester of 2011 or to the No 
Parent Outreach group who received the intervention too late to affect student behavior – 
immediately before the endline survey in second trimester. Half of the schools in each treatment 
were assigned to each group. We stratified assignment by the schools’ initial treatment group and 
sub-county, and checked for balance using the demeaned savings rates from 2010. 
Finally, we conducted the endline survey and exam during the beginning of the third trimester of 
2011.16   
                                                            
14 In 2010, Uganda included four major jurisdictions called “regions.” Spread across the four regions, were 111 
“districts.” Each district was divided into urban areas known as “municipalities” or rural areas called “counties.” 
Counties were further sub-divided into sub-counties. Depending on the population, a district could have as few as 
three or as many as thirty or more sub-counties. 
15 When they were not canceled, meetings had to be held with school administrators, the school management 
committee, and the parent-teacher association for each school. Many were initially reluctant to hold additional 
meetings. 
16 In 2012, we conducted a second, smaller experiment in which we randomly assigned a fraction of the original 
control group to receive the cash with sensitization program. We also collected the classroom-level data described 
below. However, the remaining control group proved too small. The point estimates are consistent with those 
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 B. Description of the Datasets 
The study utilizes two samples of students, as well as data at both the classroom and student 
level. First, we conduct classroom level surveys that include all students present in class at 
baseline and then all students present in class at endline. Second, we created a representative, 
longitudinal sample of students identified prior to the randomization. The first sample provides 
information on all students attending school. However, if the intervention had affected 
attendance or enrollment, it would have been subject to selection biases, both on entry and exit. 
The second sample provides information on a smaller subset of students that were tracked 
regardless of whether or not they continued to be enrolled in the original schools. 
The classroom-level data included all classes in grades five, six, and seven. Enumerators counted 
the number of children present, enrolled and possessing notebooks, math set, uniform, or 
shoes.17,18 We conducted these monitoring visits prior to the randomization as part of the baseline 
and at least once a trimester after the randomization.  
The student-level data was created by selecting 4,716 students who then completed a baseline 
survey and aptitude test prior to the randomization. To identify the students for the longitudinal 
sample, we compiled a list of all students of the correct ages and grades who were on the 
teachers’ rosters in September of 2009.19 Teachers then classified each student using a five-point 
scale to rate frequency of attendance. In particular, this allowed us to identify students on the 
rosters who did not attend school. From the set of attending children, we randomly selected 35 
students from each school in grades four and five, except for two schools in which we included 
all students because fewer than 35 students had enrolled. 
The baseline survey completed by the students in the longitudinal sample was a 40 minute 
survey that included questions about their education history, experiences with saving, time 
preferences, and demographic information. Students also completed an hour-long, 35-question 
exam covering math, grammar, and reading comprehension. Students in each grade took separate 
exams based on the national curriculum for their grade.20  
Students completed an endline survey about two years after the base line survey. The 40 minute 
survey included questions about saving behavior, possession of resources like those in the class-
level survey, such as uniforms, books, math sets, and shoes. It also included a 60 minute exam in 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
presented here, but the standard errors are too large to provide meaningful information. These results are available 
upon request. 
17 The enumerator only counted a student as having each item if the enumerator could see it. 
18 Notebooks cost approximately 200 UGX (0.08 $USD) each. In Uganda, they are usually called “exercise books.” 
A math set costs approximately 1,000 UGX (0.40 $USD) and includes such tools as a ruler, protractor and compass. 
Uniform and shoes each cost about 6,000 UGX. (2.39 $USD) They are a traditional school requirement. 
19 For a small number of classes, rosters were unavailable. We had to create a list of students based on the students 
present in class and information provided by the teacher. 
20 For both the baseline and endline exams, all scores are normalized within grade and subject relative to the 
contemporaneous control distribution. 
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 the same three subjects as the baseline exam. The grade level of the endline exam was based on 
the students’ grade at baseline. We tracked students regardless of their enrollment status. We 
found 3,838 of the original respondents. 
Finally, we verified the presence of each student in the longitudinal sample during each class-
level monitoring visit. This provided an objective measure of students’ attendance rates as well 
as whether students were still enrolled in school in the appropriate grade. 
C. Econometric Model 
Since the random assignment should ensure the orthogonality of treatment assignment and other 
student characteristics, we estimate the effects of the treatments via Ordinary Least Squares 
using the following specification: 
 Yijk = α + τ’treatj + δ’Xik + εij.       (1) 
The variable Yijk is the dependent variable of interest. We perform estimates at the student and 
class level. The index i then represents either the student or class in school j and sub-county k. 
The vector treatj is a vector of indicator variables for each treatment, and Xik is a vector of 
control variables. For each estimate, we control for baseline test scores, sub-county fixed effects 
and the baseline value of the outcome if available. We cluster standard errors by the unit of 
randomization, the school. 
Section IV. Internal Validity 
In Table 1, we verify the effectiveness of the randomization in creating observably similar 
treatment and control groups on average. Each row presents estimates for the indicated baseline 
characteristic. Columns 1-3 provide the sample size for each variable,21 the pooled treatment 
mean and standard deviation, and the control mean and standard deviation. Column 4 provides 
the regression estimates of the difference between the combined treatment group and control 
group, while Columns 5-8 provide regression estimates of the difference between each treatment 
group and the control group. All differences are estimated using equation (1), controlling for the 
sub-counties in which the schools were stratified. 
Overall, the differences are minimal, i.e., the assignment to each treatment is orthogonal to a 
series of baseline variables. Of the 70 estimates presented, only seven are statistically significant: 
one at the one-percent level, two at the five percent level, and four at the ten percent level. And 
the overall joint test of significance presented in the bottom row is not significant for any 
treatment group. Most importantly, the magnitudes of the estimated differences are also all 
relatively small. 
                                                            
21 Sample sizes vary because subjects refused to respond to some questions. 
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 Even though the groups are comparable at baseline, differential attrition could result in 
differences in the analysis sample frame (i.e., those who complete the endline survey, or take the 
endline exams). Table 2 analyzes attrition. First, Row 1 presents the basic test for whether 
treatment led to differential attrition rates overall. Columns 2 and 3 show that we have identical 
survey completion rates in treatment and control (81 percent). Columns 5-8 show that we also 
find no differences across the four treatment groups.  
However, even if overall survey completion rates are similar across treatment and control 
groups, the treatments may lead to different types of students completing the survey. To check 
for this, we replicate Table 1 analysis on various baseline measures. The table is organized 
similarly to Table 1 (except that the classroom variables are omitted, since there is no attrition at 
the classroom level). Overall, we find no evidence of compositional effects from differential 
attrition. Only six variables are statistically significant, and the only differences from Table 1 are 
the estimates for days missed per school term and amount of pocket money for the voucher 
treatment without parent sensitization. As with Table 1, the final row shows the aggregate tests, 
and we do not reject the null hypothesis of equality across treatment and control groups.  
Section V. Results 
First, we assess students’ savings behavior. In Table 3, we provide two measures of total savings 
over the two years of the program: the total per school and per student. Columns 1-4 provide the 
average for each research group. We draw three conclusions from these averages. First, the more 
restrictive savings vehicle, the voucher treatments, solicited significantly less savings than the 
less restrictive cash treatments. For both outcomes, the difference across the cash and voucher 
groups is statistically significant at the one percent level or less (Column 5). Second, we find no 
effect of the parent outreach on savings (Column 6). Finally, in results not provided in Table 3, 
we also find no effect of the parent outreach group within the cash treatment. This suggests that 
in the results below, the additional savings was driven primarily by the cash treatment and rather 
than increase savings further, the parent outreach direct these funds towards education.22 
Table 4 examines the other process and intermediate outcomes. First, in Panel A, we examine 
process outcomes from the program itself, as reported by students in the endline survey. We find 
that 77 percent of treatment students and only 11 percent of control students were familiar with 
the Supersavers program. Similarly, 39 percent of treatment group students and only 4 percent of 
control group students reported saving with Supersavers. There was little difference in program 
awareness as well as self-reported participation on the extensive margin across treatment groups. 
This thus supports the argument that the difference in outcomes is not due to differential 
marketing or promotion of the program, or differential compliance to experimental protocols, but 
rather to the attractiveness of the cash versus voucher condition and the parent outreach. We do 
not find any increase in total self-reported savings (which in theory includes “savings held at 
                                                            
22 Interestingly, both parents and children contributed. According to the endline survey, 57 percent of children 
reported having earned the money that they deposited. 
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 school”, i.e., savings held as part of this program), but we also consider these data noisy, as it is 
difficult to obtain accurate information on balances of informal savings, particularly from 
children. We thus put more weight on the administrative data (reported in Table 3) that shows 
participation in the program, and the changes in more easily observable and measured process 
and outcome changes, such as school supplies and test scores. 
We then examine intermediate outcomes, i.e., the possession of school supplies (measured both 
during classroom visits as well as in the endline survey), parental involvement, savings attitudes, 
and payment of school fees. Analysis of these questions helps to understand the mechanism 
through which the program worked. We present the results for each, but only find an impact on 
the possession of school supplies, suggesting that the other mechanisms are not responsible for 
the observed impacts.  
Table 4 Panel B presents the results on school supplies, as reported via classroom visits. The 
classroom visit school supplies index is normalized with respect to the control group mean and 
standard deviation, and takes the average of four proportions: proportion of students in the 
classroom possessing uniforms, notebooks, math sets, and shoes. In 2010, none of the treatment 
groups yields statistically significant increases relative to the control group. Relative to each 
other, the cash parent group is statistically different than the other treatment groups (Column 8), 
but this is partly the result of a decline in supplies experienced in two of the treatment groups. 
Relative to the control group, the cash with Parent Outreach treatment only improves by 0.11 
standard deviations (se=0.11). Since the main difference between 2010 and 2011 is the addition 
of the Parent Outreach, the ineffectiveness of the cash treatments provides supporting evidence 
that the Parent Outreach is a necessary component.  
For 2011, with an additional year of experience implementing the program and after the parent 
outreach had been fully launched, the Cash with Parent Outreach treatment arm performs 
considerably better than control, as well as the other three treatments (both when compared 
individually, as well as when the other treatments are pooled with control). Column 4 shows a 
0.30 standard deviation improvement (se=0.14) compared just to control. This result is then 
reinforced by the endline survey, reported in Panel C: The school supplies index from the self-
reported survey also shows in Column 4 a 0.22 standard deviation improvement (se=0.12) 
compared to control. We also find in Column 8, that the Cash with Parent Outreach is 
statistically different from the other treatments.23 We do not however observe any statistically 
significant shifts in school fees expenditures (albeit with large standard errors), self-reported 
absence because of failure to pay school fees, or amount paid for most recent tests.24 
                                                            
23 Appendix Tables 3d and 5 provide the details for each component of the supplies indexes in Panels B and C. The 
differences seem to be driven primarily by exercise books, although the individual components analysis is less 
robust statistically. 
24 This pattern of results is consistent with students’ reports on the endline survey regarding the disposition of the 
saved funds. While the quality of the data are poor, we do observe that students in the cash treatment with the parent 
sensitization report spending 3.63 percent more of the saved funds on school related expenses than students in the 
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 Table 4 Panel C also reports on data from the endline survey on parental involvement and 
savings attitudes. Although the school supplies and test score impacts are strongest on the Cash 
with Parent Outreach treatment cell, we do not observe a direct impact on an index of three 
questions25 regarding parental involvement in the child’s education (or the individual 
components, as reported in Appendix Table 3b). Furthermore, we do not observe changes in a 
savings attitudes index of seven questions.26 This may have implications for long-term change in 
saving behavior, if one posits that these attitudinal shifts are a necessary component for long-
term behavior change, after the active involvement from the NGO and savings program. 
Alternatively, the measures may be flawed, or the attitudinal changes may be unnecessary; the 
learned pattern of savings may be possible to change without changing underlying savings 
attitudes. 
Next we turn to test score results in Table 5. We put forward two basic mechanisms here: first, 
the savings account enables the purchasing of school supplies that are necessary for learning; 
second, the parental outreach leads the households and children to use the savings accounts to 
actually spend the saved money on school supplies. This is consistent with the results in Table 4 
on the impact on school supplies. And likewise, this mechanism predicts that the Cash with 
Parent Outreach treatment group should generate the largest (or only) positive impacts. Column 
4 indicates that Cash with Parent Outreach improves overall scores by 0.11 standard deviations 
(se=0.04). Looking at the components of the test, we find improvements in grammar (0.15 
standard deviations, se=0.05) and reading (0.11 standard deviation, se=0.05), but no effect on 
math.  Consistent with the hypothesized theory of change, none of the other three treatment 
groups generate statistically significant improvements compared to the control group, either 
overall or for any subject. 
We also examine whether the improved test scores arises through increased attendance or 
enrollment, but find no evidence for either. Table 6 Panel A reports results on attendance, and 
Panel B reports results on enrollment. None of the treatments generate statistically significant 
improvements relative to the control group. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
cash treatment without the sensitization. We observe no differences in the amount of the savings used to purchase 
food or clothing or given to other family members. The increase in school related expenditures primarily comes 
from “other” expenses. This difference, however, is likely too small to explain all of the observed increase in school 
supplies, suggesting that the parent sensitization functioned both to divert students’ savings and other unsaved 
household resources towards school supplies. 
25 The three questions in the Parental Involvement Index are (1) Student thinks parents are responsible for children's 
education (2) Has your parent come to your school in the past year? (3) Has your parent seen a report of yours from 
school in the past year? 
26 Savings Attitude Index includes 7 statements each of which the student evaluated on a Likert scale, 1-5. All scales 
were converted after the fact so that higher on the scale meant more positive attitude toward saving. (1) Saving 
money is not necessary if you live at home with your family. (2) Saving is a good thing to do. (3) Saving is for 
adults only. (4) My parents or relatives would be proud of me for saving. (5) Managing to save makes me feel happy 
with myself. (6) It's better to spend money today than to save it for use in the future. (7) Every time I get money I 
put away some money for saving. 
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 Last we examine several attitudinal indices, and child labor, in Table 7. Starting with the five 
attitudinal indexes, we note caution in interpretation: in theory, these may be either intermediate 
outcomes influenced directly by the treatment(s), or consequences of the shift in resources and 
test scores. In practice, we observe only two statistically significant shifts out of 20 estimates..  
In terms of child labor, critics of financial education for youth posit that introducing children to 
savings and financial decision-making may have the unintended consequence of focusing their 
attention on income, and then discourage school attendance in order to work (Varcoe et al. 
2005). Berry, Karlan and Pradhan (2013) tests this in Ghana with students of similar age as this 
study, and finds that a financial education curriculum along with a savings box (but no directive 
or facilitation of using the savings for education expenses) did lead to higher child labor, whereas 
if a social values component was added to the financial education curriculum, there was no 
impact on child labor. In our setting, we find no impact from the program on child labor, either 
hours worked or total wages. Overall, the estimates from Tables 6 and 7, combined with the 
other outcomes, indicate that the observed effects on learning occur solely through changes in 
available supplies rather than changes in attitude or participation. 
Section VI. Conclusion 
Weaker rather than stronger commitments can, in some instances, prove more effective. In the 
context of an educational savings program, we find that families and children save more under a 
weaker savings strategy in which funds are not dedicated to educational expenses upon deposit 
than they do under a strict commitment savings program in which all deposits are dedicated to 
educational expenses. The purpose of commitment savings devices is to intentionally limit the 
use of deposited funds. In some contexts, however, such services may need to strike a balance 
between providing sufficient limitations to make the savings mechanisms useful while being 
careful not to make the limitations so severe that they deter savings. Understanding the nature of 
this trade-off is an important direction for future research. 
When combined with a parent sensitization program, we find that families and children spend 
their savings on educational expenses (school supplies). This does not, however, alter school 
participation – we find no effects on enrollment or attendance – but does improve students’ 
scores on a basic math and language test by 0.13 standard deviations. This suggests that financial 
constraints may play an important role in students’ academic performance and that understanding 
the role of families’ financial decision process may be an important element in understanding the 
overall production process of education. 
On a practical level, several implementation issues are important to explore.  As a program 
designed to improve student learning, treatment effects of this magnitude are large compared to 
other evaluations of interventions designed to provide resources to schools or directly to children 
(Jameel Poverty Action Lab 2014), but they are small relative to many other types of programs 
(most notably, for example, programs that provide additional resources while also changing 
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 pedagogical strategies). Taking the programs relative low cost (2.24 USD per student per year) 
into account using the methodology proposed by Dhaliwal et. al.(2014), however, the program 
delivers learning gains at a cost of 1.49 USD per tenth of a standard deviation or 6.71 standard 
deviations per 100 USD.27 This is very competitive relative to other programs. Relative to the 27 
studies compared by J-PAL (2014), only four produce improvements in test scores more cost-
effectively. 
In terms of encourage family savings, the program costs were high relative to the savings 
generated. However, if the program generated long term savings behavior change, then between 
the continued savings and the improvement in educational outcomes, it would surpass typical 
cost benefit calculations. In addition, it may be possible to reduce costs, particularly with 
implementation via mobile banking. This would obviate the need for physical transfer of cash to 
a bank, and would lower the risk of theft from keeping cash in a (albeit locked) box at the school. 
However, if the group nature of the intervention (i.e., the public and communal training) was an 
important element for take-up (through mimicking of peers, or learning from peers) and 
adherence (through monitoring and potential for social recognition), then a mobile banking 
implementation may lose that visual classroom element. Although these peer mechanisms were 
not emphasized in the training and implementation of the program, the fact that the savings were 
done publicly may have had such an effect. 
On a more theoretical level, these results open up many related questions. Are external 
interventions of this sort effective in changing long term behavior, i.e., does the psychic cost of 
deviation persist, even without an outsider-led intervention? Did the intervention shift the 
preferences of the child, or the parents, or both, and what does this imply for intra-household 
cross-generational bargaining issues? How critical was the timing element of the “soft” 
commitment device, i.e., the fact that the school supplies were immediately available for 
purchase at the time of withdrawal? If that was critical, it is a ringing endorsement for the “make 
it easy” mantra, and also implies that the soft commitment device may have worked for reasons 
elaborated on in Mullainathan and Shafir (2013), because it increased the attention of individuals 





27 Estimates are provided in 2011 USD. 
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Dependent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Classroom Survey: % of students in attendance 811 0.09 0.10 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Classroom Survey: Supplies Index 813 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.22* 0.04 -0.12 -0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.11) (0.15) (0.19) (0.14)
Normalized Test Score: Grammar 4710 0.08 0.00 0.11 0.12 -0.02 0.18* 0.14
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
Normalized Test Score: Reading 4713 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
Normalized Test Score: Math 4715 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.07 0.08
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10)
Normalized Test Score: Total 4716 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.04 -0.03 0.11 0.11
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11)
4716 1.43 1.42 0.00 -0.07 0.10 -0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10)
Student Survey: Days missed per school term 3886 1.63 1.64 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 0.10*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
4702 0.65 0.64 0.01 0.02 -0.00 -0.04 0.07**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
4699 0.29 0.24 0.04** 0.06 0.07** -0.02 0.07**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
4678 0.75 0.74 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.07*** -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
4698 204.20 214.45 -7.92 -17.84 -1.30 9.69 -21.83
(5.13) (6.65) (13.91) (16.31) (19.61) (18.07) (19.39)
1.35 1.16 1.08 1.25 1.10
(0.21) (0.32) (0.38) (0.27) (0.37)
Student Survey: Prefer 500 UGX today to 800 UGX next week
Student Survey: Child receives pocket money from family
Student Survey: Amount received in pocket money (UGX)
% of students in attendance: The enumerators count of the number of students present during a classroom visit, divided by the enrollment in the class as provided by the teacher.
Supplies Index: the normalized mean of 4 binary measures: whether a student has a uniform, notebook, mathset, and shoes. The coefficient is expressed as standard deviations
from the control mean. Attendance Code: A subjectively recorded code given with the enrollment data that indicates how frequently a student attends, from 1 (always attends) to
6 (never attends). OLS specifications: Columns 4 and Columns 5-8 include robust standard errors, clustered by school (the unit of randomization), and subcounty fixed effects
(the stratification variable). * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<.01
Table 1: Summary Statistics and Orthogonality Verification of Random Assignment, Full Sample Frame from Baseline
Mean (standard deviation) and OLS
Mean
(std dev) OLS (one specification per row)
Student Survey: Attendance Code (lower = more attendance)
Student Survey: Prefer 500 UGX today to 800 UGX tomorrow
Joint Significance Test F-stat, one regression per column with 
























Dependent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Endline survey completed (of baseline students) 4716 0.81 0.81 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.02
(0.39) (0.39) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Normalized Test Score: Grammar 3832 0.09 0.01 0.06* 0.09** 0.00 0.10** 0.05
(0.99) (1.00) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Normalized Test Score: Reading 3835 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.07 -0.03
(1.02) (1.00) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Normalized Test Score: Math 3837 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02
(0.98) (0.98) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Normalized Test Score: Total 3837 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.99) (0.99) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
3837 1.42 1.42 -0.01 -0.08 0.07 -0.03 -0.01
(0.94) (0.90) (0.07) (0.12) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10)
Student Survey: Days missed per school term 3145 1.62 1.63 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.09
(0.91) (0.93) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
3828 1.37 1.37 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.48) (0.48) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
2415 1.49 1.52 -0.03 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.03
(0.50) (0.50) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
3805 0.75 0.74 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.05** -0.02
(0.43) (0.44) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
3821 199.30 217.59 -16.08 -19.38 -12.07 3.27 -34.54*
(248.80) (303.02) (15.17) (18.37) (21.01) (18.98) (18.34)
Student Survey: Total annual hours worked, winsorized at 99% 3838 295.33 294.96 3.43 -4.32 -32.83 29.91 20.04
(461.85) (447.26) (17.63) (23.24) (28.38) (29.82) (26.39)
3838 18.00 18.00 -0.05 -1.90 -2.90 3.59* 0.97
(34.00) (34.00) (1.37) (1.72) (2.23) (2.09) (2.02)
Student Survey: Prefer 500 UGX today to 800 UGX next week
Table 2: Summary Statistics and Orthogonality Verification of Random Assignment, Post-Attrition Sample Frame
Mean (standard deviation) and OLS
Mean
(std dev) OLS (one specification per row)
Student Survey: Attendance Code (lower = more attendance)
% of students in attendance: The enumerators count of the number of students present during a classroom visit, divided by the enrollment in the class as provided by the
teacher. Supplies Index: the normalized mean of 4 binary measures: whether a student has a uniform, notebook, mathset, and shoes. The coefficient is expressed as
standard deviations from the control mean. Attendance Code: A subjectively recorded code given with the enrollment data that indicates how frequently a student attends,
from 1 (always attends) to 6 (never attends). OLS specifications: Columns 4 and Columns 5-8 include robust standard errors, clustered by school (the unit of
randomization), and subcounty fixed effects (the stratification variable). 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<.01
Student Survey: Prefer 500 UGX today to 1,000 UGX next week
Student Survey: Child receives pocket money from family
Student Survey: Amount received in pocket money (UGX)
Student Survey: Total annual income from work (in 10,000 
























Dependent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
155,839.47     162,102.50     65,365.79       70,320.00       0.00*** 0.82
(143978.54) (113092.36) (49198.50) (49640.02)
177.51 288.8 128.04 111.02 0.01*** 0.27
(104.04) (293.51) (110.18) (110.63)
Observations (schools) 19 20 19 20
Results from bank administrative school-level data. Cumulative savings deposits for full two years of the program. Note that these data are collected at the school level,
i.e., the Average Deposits per Student is the average across schools of the average deposits per student at each school. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<.01. 
Table 3: Super Savers Program Savings by Treatment Group
Mean (standard error)
Mean 
(standard error) p-value from t-test
Average Cumulative Deposits Made per School


















Dependent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Process Outcomes (Endline Survey)
Heard of Super Savers program 3831 0.79 0.11 0.69*** 0.67*** 0.68*** 0.64*** 0.23
(0.41) (0.32) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Saved with Super Savers 3832 0.44 0.03 0.42*** 0.39*** 0.44*** 0.35*** 0.37
(0.50) (0.18) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Ever Saves Money 3829 0.79 0.79 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.86
(0.40) (0.41) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
3838 7.03 7.88 -0.36 -1.40** -0.15 -0.95* 0.41
(13.99) (15.10) (0.63) (0.59) (0.61) (0.53)
Primary Source of Savings was Work 3838 0.43 0.47 -0.06** -0.04 0.00 -0.05** 0.24
(0.50) (0.50) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Panel B: Intermediate Outcomes (Classroom Visits)
School Supplies Index 2010 813 -0.23 -0.08 0.12 -0.05 -0.17 -0.21 0.06
(1.18) (0.88) (0.13) (0.20) (0.24) (0.19)
School Supplies Index 2011 882 0.30 0.21 0.32** 0.04 -0.09 0.07 0.02
(0.95) (0.92) (0.14) (0.17) (0.21) (0.16)
Overall School Supplies Index 813 -0.16 -0.31 0.22* 0.04 -0.12 -0.05 0.02
(0.88) (0.79) (0.11) (0.15) (0.19) (0.14)
Panel C: Intermediate Outcomes (Endline Survey)
Parental Involvement Index 3838 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.42
(1.04) (1.00) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Savings Attitude Index 3838 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.76
(1.00) (1.00) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
School Supplies Index 3838 0.01 0.00 0.11* 0.02 -0.06 -0.04 0.02
(1.02) (1.00) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
School Fees 3838 28,804.26    33,580.77   -6158.51 -6179.58 -3000.08 -3340.79 0.55
(64594.63) (76629.27) (4445.07) (5017.89) (4698.29) (5229.41)
3583 0.18 0.18 -0.01 -0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.67
(0.38) (0.39) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Cost of most recent test 2348 1506.71 1589.22 -68.45 78.24 -318.33 55.89 0.95
(2658.92) (2843.68) (273.29) (255.71) (245.58) (302.07)
See next page for notes
Missed school because sent to look for fees or 
lack of scholastic materials
Total self-reported savings ('000 UGX), 1% 
winsor
P-value for test 
of Cash Parent = 
Other 
Treatments
Table 4: Process and Intermediate Outcomes, Intent to Treat Estimates




(each row = one regression)
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Table 4 Notes: Total Self Reported Savings (Endline Survey): sum of amount of money respondents reported savings in each of a variety of locations (at home 
in local bank, hidden at home, give to a family member, savings program at school -- which likely includes the savings held as part of the treatment, in a bank 
account of a family member, other). School Supplies Index (Classroom Visits): Enumerators at several classroom visits each term counted the number of 
students with school supplies then we divided that number by the number of students in attendance. School Supplies Index (Endline Survey): the percentage of 
students that have uniforms, notebooks, mathsets, and shoes. Parental Involvement Index includes 3 questions: 1) Student thinks parents are responsible for 
children's education. 2) Has your parent come to your school in the past year? 3) Has your parent seen a report of yours from school in the past year? Savings 
Attitude Index includes 7 statements each of which the student evaluated on a Likert scale, 1-5. All scales were converted after the fact so that higher on the 
scale meant more positive attitude toward saving. 1) Saving money is not necessary if you live at home with your family. 2) Saving is a good thing to do. 3) 
Saving is for adults only. 4) My parents or relatives would be proud of me for saving. 5) Managing to save makes me feel happy with myself. 6) It's better to 
spend money today than to save it for use in the future. 7) Every time I get money I put away some money for saving. Column 5 compares the Cash with Parent 
Outreach to the pool of the three other treatments and control group. OLS specifications: Columns 4-7 include robust standard errors, clustered by school (the 
unit of randomization), a control for children's mean testing score, and subcounty fixed effects (the stratification variables). *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<.01. 



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Grammar 3768 0.05 -0.01 0.15*** 0.03 0.06 -0.05 0.01
(1.05) (0.99) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
Reading 3765 0.02 0.00 0.11** 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.00
(1.01) (1.00) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
Math 3768 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.11** -0.01 -0.09 0.09
(1.00) (1.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07)
Total 3765 0.01 0.00 0.11** -0.02 0.00 -0.06 0.00
(1.02) (1.00) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07)
P-value for test 
of Cash Parent = 
Other 
Treatments
OLS specifications: Columns 4-7 include robust standard errors, clustered by school (the unit of randomization), a control for children's mean 
testing score, and subcounty fixed effects (the stratification variables). *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<.01. Column 8 is the p-value of an F-test of 
sigificance on a regression of the cash parent treatment against all other treatmnets and the same controls from Columns 4-7. 
Table 5: Effect of Super Savers on Normalized Test Scores






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Attendance rate
2010 4705 0.35 0.35 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.24
(0.42) (0.42) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
2011 4705 0.20 0.17 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.42
(0.38) (0.35) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Overall (2010 & 2011 combined) 4705 0.29 0.28 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.27
(0.37) (0.36) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Attendance Index 3586 -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.00 -0.05 -0.03 0.23
(0.98) (1.00) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Panel B: Enrollment rate
2010 4716 0.44 0.44 -0.08 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.15
(0.50) (0.50) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
2011 4716 0.24 0.22 -0.02 -0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.39
(0.43) (0.41) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
P-value for test 
of Cash Parent = 
Other 
Treatments
Attendance Rate: Based on a roll call of students on the official school enrollment list, counting only those students present in the class when roll call was 
done. Attendance Index: includes 3 self-reported questions on student attendance: 1) Of the five school days of last week, how many were you absent? 2) 
Think of a normal week from last term, of the five school days how many were you usually absent from school? 3) Think of a normal month from last 
term, how many days were you usually absent? Enrollment Rate: Based on teacher responses as to whether a student on the official school enrollment list, 
was still enrolled at that school. OLS specifications: Columns 4-7 include robust standard errors, clustered by school (the unit of randomization), a control 
for children's mean testing score, and subcounty fixed effects (the stratification variables). *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<.01. Column 8 is the p-value of an F-
test of sigificance on a regression of the cash parent treatment against all other treatmnets and the same controls from Columns 4-7. 
Table 6: Effect of Super Savers on School Participation






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Self Esteem Index 3838 -0.02*** -0.00*** -0.05** -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.23
(0.44) (0.44) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Time Preference Index 3838 -0.04*** 0.00*** -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 0.55
(1.01) (1.00) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Locus of Control 3826 1.58 1.60 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.75
(0.49) (0.49) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Financial Independence Index 3838 -0.04*** 0.00*** -0.06 -0.13** 0.05 -0.01 0.64
(0.97) (1.00) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Aspirations Index 3838 -0.01*** 0.00*** -0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.56
(1.04) (1.00) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06)
Total annual hours worked, wins. 99% 3838 295.33 294.96 -4.32 -32.83 29.91 20.04 0.69
(461.85) (447.26) (23.24) (28.38) (29.82) (26.39)
3838 18.00 18.00 -1.87 -2.91 3.59* 0.97 0.17
(34.00) (34.00) (1.72) (2.23) (2.09) (2.02)
P-value for test 
of Cash Parent = 
Other 
Treatments
Self Esteem Index: includes 10 statements each of which the student evaluated on a Likert scale, 1-5. All scales were converted after the fact so that higher on the 
scale meant higher self esteem. 1) I am satisfied with myself. 2) Sometimes I think I am no good at all. 3) I believe I have a number of good qualities. 4) I am able to 
do things as well as most children. 5) I do not have much to be proud of. 6) Sometimes I feel useless. 7) I believe I am a valuable person, at least as much as my 
classmates. 8) I wish I could have more respect for myself 9) I sometimes think that I am a failure. 10) When I think of myself, I usually think good thoughts. In 
addition to those 10 statements, there is one question: 11) Are you confident that you will be successful in the future? Time Preference Index: includes 2 hypothetical 
time preference choices. 1) Would you rather receive 500 shillings today or 800 shillings next week? 2) Would you rather receive 500 shillings today or 1,000 
shillings next week? From these, respondents were split into low, medium, and high future preference groups. Locus of Control: If a person is successful in life, is it 
because he or she was lucky or because he or she worked very hard? (1=yes, 2=no) Financial Independence Index: includes 3 questions: 1) How much money do you 
think you will get in the next 7 days? 2) How much money did you get in the past 7 days? 3) How much pocket money are you given to spend as you wish? 
Aspirations Index: includes 4 questions about academic and vocation aspirations: 1) If you graduate from primary school, will your life be better than if you hadn’t 
graduated?  2) Do you think you will go to secondary school? 3) Do you think you will reach university? 4) What do you want to be when you grow up? (student 
responded with career that requires higher education) Exchange rate: 2815 Ugandan Shillings per US dollar. OLS specifications: Columns 4-7 include robust standard 
errors, clustered by school (the unit of randomization), a control for children's mean testing score, and subcounty fixed effects (the stratification variables). *p<0.10 
**p<0.05 ***p<.01. Column 8 is the p-value of an F-test of sigificance on a regression of the cash parent treatment against all other treatmnets and the same controls 
from Columns 4-7. 
Table 7: Effect of Super Savers on Student Attitudes




(each row = one regression)




Grades Covered P5, P6 P6, P7
Median age 12, 13 13, 14
Sample Size (Students) 4983 4059
Attendance Survey
Grades Covered P5, P6 P6, P7 P7
Median age 12, 13 13, 14 14
Sample Size (Students) 37874 29016 13681
Classroom Survey
Grades Covered P5, P6, P7 P5, P6, P7 P5, P6, P7
Median age 12, 13, 14 12, 13, 14 12, 13, 14
Sample Size (Classes) 406 408 340















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash with Parent Outreach -0.002 -0.004 -0.02 -0.0004 -0.002 -0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08)
Cash w/o Parent Outreach -0.01 -0.006 0.06 0.002 0.003 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08)
Voucher with Parent Outreach 0.004 0.007 0.06 0.008 0.008 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07)
Voucher w/o Parent Outreach 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07)
Constant 0.76*** 0.71*** 0.69*** 0.75*** 0.69*** 0.69***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06)
Observations 4983 4057 4057 4983 4057 4057
Covariates No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Interactions between each covariate and each treatment 
variable No No Yes No No Yes
Control mean 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.80
(Control sd) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40)
0.70 0.53 0.30 0.15
(0.59) (0.71) (0.88) (0.96)
1.57** 1.45*
(0.02) (0.05)
Appendix Table 2: Additional Attrition Analysis
OLS
F-test (p-value) of joint significance of the four treatment 
assignments
All specifications are OLS, include subcounty (the stratification variable) fixed effects, and cluster standard errors by school. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<.01
F-test (p-value) of joint significance of interaction terms of 


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Savings Attitude Index & Components
Savings Attitude Index 3838 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.76
(1.00) (1.00) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
3819 3.07 2.96 0.14** 0.12** 0.11* 0.07 0.50
(0.81) (0.85) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Saving is a good thing to do. 3830 3.49 3.50 -0.06 0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.09
(0.54) (0.54) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Saving is for adults only. 3818 3.36 3.33 0.03 0.07* 0.00 0.01 0.95
(0.64) (0.65) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
3769 3.21 3.20 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.97
(0.58) (0.61) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
3819 3.38 3.35 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.81
(0.58) (0.61) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
3813 3.16 3.13 0.00 0.06 0.08** 0.00 0.30
(0.70) (0.70) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
3812 3.04 3.05 0.01 -0.05 0.03 -0.04 0.63
(0.68) (0.71) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Financial Independence Index & Components
Financial Independence Index 3838 -0.04 0.00 -0.06 -0.13** 0.05 -0.01 0.64
(0.97) (1.00) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
3650 2245.60 2399.59 -229.96 -447.79* 201.19 -40.54 0.53
(4225.71) (4587.07) (213.72) (252.52) (250.32) (243.15)
3838 1957.95 2038.95 -125.25 -412.22** 269.55 -18.67 0.69
(3332.84) (3464.53) (191.67) (189.24) (187.60) (154.55)
3838 4394.88 4584.16 -336.91 -436.43 -4.05 -51.66 0.78
(7170.65) (7246.93) (357.98) (413.56) (534.25) (428.97)
P-value for test 
of Cash Parent = 
Other 
Treatments
Notes: All specifications are OLS, include subcounty (the stratification variable) fixed effects, and cluster standard errors by school. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Appendix Table 3a: Effect of Super Savers on Financial Indices and their Components
Mean (standard deviation) and OLS
It's better to spend money today than to save it for use 
in the future.
Managing to save makes me feel happy with myself.
My parents or relatives would be proud of me for 
saving.
Saving money is not necessary if you live at home with 
your family.
How much pocket money are you given to spend as you 
wish? winsorized at 99%
How much money did you get in the past 7 days? 
winsorized at 99%
How much money do you think you will get in the next 
7 days? winsorized at 99%























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Parental Involvement Index & Components
Parental Involvement Index 3838 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.42
(1.04) (1.00) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Has parent seen a report from school in the past year? 3838 0.90 0.90 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.19
(0.30) (0.29) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Has your parent come to your school in the past year? 3838 0.71 0.71 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.69
(0.46) (0.45) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Student thinks parents are responsible for education. 3838 0.72 0.70 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.96
(0.45) (0.46) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Aspirations Index & Components
Aspirations Index 3838 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.56
(1.04) (1.00) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06)
Do you think you will go to secondary school? 3699 -0.05 0.00 -0.10 -0.03 0.00 -0.09 0.39
(1.11) (1.00) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06)
Do you think you will reach university? 3057 -0.05 0.00 -0.05 -0.10* 0.00 -0.09 0.95
(1.04) (1.00) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
3838 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.26
(0.94) (1.00) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
3838 0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.09
(0.98) (1.00) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Attendance Index & Components
Attendance Index 3586 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 0.23
(0.98) (1.00) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Of five school days of last week, was absent for 3585 0.75 0.70 0.13 0.07 0.04 -0.02 0.33
(1.33) (1.27) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
3586 1.27 1.31 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.44
(1.48) (1.54) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
3463 3.34 3.59 -0.27 -0.18 -0.37** -0.16 0.80
(3.13) (3.55) (0.17) (0.21) (0.17) (0.19)
P-value for 
test of Cash 
Parent = Other 
Treatments
Notes: All specifications are OLS, include subcounty (the stratification variable) fixed effects, and cluster standard errors by school. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Appendix Table 3b: Effect of Super Savers on Academic Indices and their Components
Mean (standard deviation) and OLS
Think of a normal month from last term, how many days were 
you usually absent?
In normal week from last term, how many days were you 
usually absent from school?
What do you want to be when you grow up? (student responded 




(each row = one regression)
If you graduate from primary school, will your life be better 


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Self Esteem Index & Components
Self Esteem Index 3838 -0.02 0.00 -0.05** -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.23
(0.44) (0.44) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
I am satisfied with myself. 3812 3.20 3.21 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.98
(0.67) (0.64) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Sometimes I think I am no good at all. 3817 2.55 2.54 -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.09
(0.79) (0.77) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
I believe I have a number of good qualities. 3800 3.14 3.19 -0.07 -0.08* -0.03 -0.04 0.68
(0.71) (0.69) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
I am able to do things as well as most children. 3822 3.31 3.33 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.38
(0.62) (0.62) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
I do not have much to be proud of. 3777 2.42 2.43 0.03 -0.07 -0.02 0.01 0.23
(0.77) (0.78) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Sometimes I feel useless. 3816 3.08 3.08 -0.05 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.05
(0.80) (0.81) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
3808 3.25 3.28 -0.07* 0.01 -0.06 -0.04 0.34
(0.62) (0.64) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
I wish I could have more respect for myself. 3755 1.96 1.94 0.03 -0.06 0.05 0.02 0.61
(0.62) (0.61) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
I sometimes think that I am a failure. 3814 2.98 2.96 -0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.09** 0.11
(0.84) (0.86) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
3828 2.96 2.98 -0.04 0.02 -0.10** 0.01 0.83
(0.81) (0.82) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
3652 0.96 0.97 -0.01 -0.02** -0.01 -0.01 0.91
(0.21) (0.18) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Time Preference Index & Components
Time Preference Index 3828 2.05 2.07 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.96
(0.83) (0.82) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
3828 1.37 1.37 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.44
(0.48) (0.48) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
2415 1.49 1.52 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.31
(0.50) (0.50) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
P-value for test 
of Cash Parent = 
Other 
Treatments
Notes: All specifications are OLS, include subcounty (the stratification variable) fixed effects, and cluster standard errors by school. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Appendix Table 3c: Effect of Super Savers on Self Esteem and Time Preference Indices and their Components
Mean (standard deviation) and OLS
I believe I am a valuable person, at least as much as 
my classmates.
Would you rather receive 500 UGX today or 1,000 
UGX next week?
Would you rather receive 500 UGX today or 800 
UGX next week?
Are you confident that you will be successful in the 
future ?






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
School Supplies Index & Components
3838 0.01 0.00 0.11* 0.02 -0.06 -0.04 0.02
(1.02) (1.00) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
Shoes 3838 0.20 0.19 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.72
(0.40) (0.39) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Uniform 3838 0.70 0.70 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.05
(0.46) (0.46) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Math Set 3838 0.38 0.36 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.55
(0.49) (0.48) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Pencils 3838 0.66 0.67 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.98
(0.47) (0.47) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Exercise Book 3838 0.44 0.44 0.07** -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.00
(0.50) (0.50) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
P-value for test 
of Cash Parent = 
Other Treatments
Notes: All specifications are OLS, include subcounty (the stratification variable) fixed effects, and cluster standard errors 
by school. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Appendix Table 3d: Effect of Super Savers on School Supplies Index and its Components






(each row = one regression)
31
Number 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Annual School Fees for Each Student (in USD), winsorized at 90%
Total of All Fees 3793 13.53 14.05 0.00 2.66 6.93 21.31 42.56
General Fee 3791 7.44 11.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.50 31.90
Food Fees 3792 1.24 1.70 0.00 0.00 0.09 1.83 5.12
Lunch Fee 3792 0.89 1.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.13 4.39
Chef/Grinding Fee 3791 0.22 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.07
Testing Fees 3792 2.13 2.52 0.00 0.00 1.07 3.20 7.46
Standardized Test Fee 3791 1.03 1.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.28 4.97
Practice Test Fee 3792 0.54 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.07 1.60
Test Paper Fee 3791 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
School Infrastructure Fees 3792 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.07
Development Fee 3791 0.11 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.07
School Necessities Fee 3792 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Extra Lessons Fee 3791 0.40 1.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.20
Panel B: Average Annual School Fees per Student for Each School (in USD), winsorized at 90%
Total of All Fees 136 16.47 10.84 2.93 8.51 13.35 20.74 41.22
General Fee 136 10.60 9.52 0.00 3.80 7.80 12.58 32.74
Food Fees 136 2.21 1.97 0.00 0.90 1.58 2.67 6.92
Lunch Fee 136 1.92 2.05 0.00 0.62 1.02 2.18 6.88
Chef/Grinding Fee 136 0.27 0.27 0.00 0.02 0.16 0.47 0.78
Testing Fees 136 2.39 1.12 0.01 1.54 2.24 3.26 4.38
Standardized Test Fee 136 1.28 0.84 0.00 0.62 1.20 1.88 2.71
Practice Test Fee 136 0.69 0.46 0.00 0.33 0.71 1.04 1.42
Test Paper Fee 136 0.31 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 1.43
School Infrastructure Fees 136 0.32 0.35 0.00 0.04 0.17 0.50 1.01
Development Fee 136 0.23 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.37 0.83
School Necessities Fee 136 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.23
Extra Lessons Fee 136 0.74 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 1.02 3.20
Appendix Table 4: Summary Statistics of Annual School Fees
The data here incorporate student-reported fees across three terms. Numbers are in USD, converted from UGX in Sept 2011
(when endline survey was conducted) at 2815UGX = 1USD. General Fee: A fee required to attend school. Because the
government discourages General Fees, most schools do not charge them, but some schools, especially in urban areas still do.
Food Fees: include lunch fees and chef/grinding fees. The chef/grinding fee can either be monetary or in-kind (e.g., maize). We
imputed the value of maize at 450 UGX/kg. Testing Fees: include standardized test fees, practice test fees, and test paper fees.
Practice test fee is often optional. School Infrastructure Fees: include Development Fee and School Necessities Fee. The
Development Fee is generally for infrastructure projects such as latrines, building repair, etc. The School Necessities Fee


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reports owning at least 1 pair of shoes 3838 0.63 0.62 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.89
(0.48) (0.49) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Student wearing shoes during survey 3838 0.20 0.19 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.72
(0.40) (0.39) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Reports owning at least 1 uniform 3837 0.84 0.86 0.01 0.00 -0.05* -0.04 0.09
(0.36) (0.35) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Child wearing uniform during interview 3838 0.70 0.70 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.05
(0.46) (0.46) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Reports owning a math set 3838 0.38 0.36 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.55
(0.49) (0.48) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Shows enumerator math set 3838 0.24 0.21 0.04** 0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.18
(0.42) (0.41) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Reports owning at least 1 pen or pencil 3838 0.93 0.94 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.55
(0.25) (0.23) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Shows enumerator at least 1 pen or pencil 3838 0.82 0.82 -0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.80
(0.38) (0.38) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Reports owning at least 1 exercise book 3838 0.91 0.93 0.00 -0.01 -0.04* -0.00 0.24
(0.28) (0.26) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Shows enumerator at least 1 exercise book 3838 0.73 0.73 -0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.00 0.82
(0.45) (0.44) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Notes: All specifications are OLS, include subcounty (the stratification variable) fixed effects, and cluster standard errors by school. * p<0.10 ** 
p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Appendix Table 5: Effect of Super Savers on Individual School Supplies Items




(each row = one regression)
P-value for test 
of Cash Parent = 
Other 
Treatments
33
